There is a line that has been repeated for over a century in the diamond industry: a diamond is forever. Anglo American, the London-listed mining giant that owns 85% of De Beers, has made its position clear: De Beers no longer fits the portfolio it is building for the future.
This Thursday, April 16, Anglo has set a deadline for final bids on De Beers, the company it has spent the better part of two years trying to offload. The sale is the centrepiece of a radical restructuring that has already seen Anglo exit platinum, steelmaking coal, and nickel, as it sharpens its focus on copper and iron ore — metals it considers the commodities of the future. De Beers, by contrast, has become an asset it is actively looking to exit.
Anglo has now written down De Beers' value three consecutive times in as many years — a $1.6 billion impairment in 2023, a $2.9 billion cut in 2024, and a further $2.3 billion reduction in early 2026 — reducing the business to a carrying value that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. In total, Anglo has recorded more than $6 billion in cumulative impairments on De Beers over three years. The business posted a loss of over $500 million in 2025 alone, as challenging rough diamond trading conditions persisted across the industry.
The Crisis Beneath the Carats
The reasons for De Beers' deterioration go deeper than one bad quarter or one weak market. The natural diamond industry is confronting something far more fundamental: a significant technological disruption that is reshaping consumer choice.
Lab-grown diamonds have captured roughly 20% of the global market by value — and in the US engagement ring segment, the single most important market in the world for natural stones, they now account for close to half of all units sold. These stones are chemically and physically identical to natural diamonds but cost up to 80% less to produce. For an industry built on romance and rarity, that shift in consumer sentiment represents a significant commercial challenge.
Younger buyers, in particular, are increasingly indifferent to the distinction between a stone pulled from the earth and one grown in a laboratory in a matter of weeks. The emotional premium that natural diamonds command — built over generations through provenance, rarity, and tradition — is now being tested by the growing accessibility of laboratory-grown alternatives.
Compounding the structural challenge are cyclical headwinds: a sharp pullback in Chinese luxury spending, the lingering weight of US tariffs, and a persistent oversupply of rough diamonds that has kept prices under sustained pressure. De Beers' average realised price per carat fell again in 2025. The company has responded by aggressively cutting production — slashing its 2026 output guidance by nearly a third compared to earlier projections — but curtailing supply has done little to stabilise prices when demand itself is weakening at the source.
The Bidders and the Standoff
Against this difficult backdrop, Anglo is attempting to execute one of the most complex mining asset sales in recent memory. Multiple private consortia have emerged as interested parties, including a group led by former De Beers CEO Gareth Penny backed by Qatari-linked investment funds, a team assembled by Australian mining veteran Michael O'Keeffe, and a group connected to diamond trader Nir Livnat. Anglo's CEO has expressed optimism that a deal can be closed before the end of the year.
But the real complication comes not with the private bidders. It is Botswana.
The southern African nation currently holds 15% of De Beers and has made clear, through President Duma Boko, that it wants a controlling stake — meaning more than 50%. That ambition sits in direct conflict with the interests of private investors, who are unlikely to commit significant capital to a business where a government holds a majority vote and the ability to override commercial decision-making. The two positions are, for now, fundamentally incompatible — and both sides know it.
What makes Botswana's stance both understandable and precarious is the sheer scale of its dependence on diamonds. The stone accounts for roughly 80% of the country's total exports and around a quarter of its gross domestic product. Diamond revenues fund approximately a third of the government's annual budget. Schools, hospitals, infrastructure — much of modern Botswana was built on the back of a single gem. This is not a country that can afford to treat De Beers as simply a financial investment. For Gaborone, the diamond supply chain is the economy.
Yet the timing could hardly be worse. Botswana's sovereign credit rating was downgraded earlier this year amid rising fiscal pressure. Its economy contracted in both 2024 and 2025. Its fiscal deficit is forecast to approach 9% of GDP in the coming year. A government fighting to maintain financial credibility while simultaneously attempting to finance a multi-billion dollar acquisition is walking a tightrope — with very little margin for error.
The Logic of Sovereignty and Its Limits
Botswana's insistence on control is not irrational. A country that contributes more than two-thirds of De Beers' rough stone output but captures only the economics of a minority shareholder has every right to question how value is being distributed. Owning the brand, the distribution network, and the global marketing apparatus — rather than just the mine — would, in theory, transform Botswana from a raw material supplier into a vertically integrated operator with genuine pricing power.
But theory and execution are very different things. Acquiring a controlling stake in a global luxury and mining conglomerate requires not just capital, but deep management capability, established international market relationships, and institutional infrastructure that takes years to build. The risk is that Botswana ends up with majority control of an asset in a prolonged market downturn, burdened by acquisition debt, at precisely the moment when the natural diamond industry needs bold commercial reinvention rather than cautious state stewardship.
The private investors, by contrast, bring capital, agility, and the commercial instincts that distressed assets typically require to recover. A hybrid model — in which Botswana holds a significant but not controlling stake alongside a capable private operator — may ultimately serve the country's long-term interests better than the political satisfaction of a majority vote.
Angola and Namibia, both of which have expressed interest in participating in some form, could also complicate or enrich the final ownership structure, depending on how negotiations unfold in the days ahead.
What Comes Next?
Thursday's deadline will almost certainly not be the end of this story. Anglo may receive binding bids, but the negotiation between those bidders and the government of Botswana over ownership structure, governance rights, and financing arrangements is likely to extend well beyond this week. Anglo's CEO has been explicit: a deal requires agreement with all parties, including Gaborone, before anything can be finalised.
What is clear is that the outcome will matter well beyond the boardrooms of London and Gaborone. It will shape the ownership model for one of the world's most recognised luxury brands, determine the economic trajectory of an entire nation, and set a precedent for how African resource-producing states engage with the global mining industry in an era of profound commodity disruption.
The diamond may be forever. The question of who benefits from it, however, is very much up for renegotiation.